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CITY COURT OF NEW YORK
CITY OF WATERTOWN
People v. Carreira'
(decided January 12, 2010)
Raven Carreira was arrested and charged with driving while
intoxicated and aggravated driving while intoxicated. 2 Carreira con-
tended that her Confrontation Clause rights under the United States
and New York Constitutions' were violated when the People failed to
"produce the authors of [breathalyzer certification records] for cross-
examination."4  Therefore, the record's "admission and the . . . evi-
dence [the records] support[ed]" should have been precluded.' The
court granted the defendant's motion to preclude the evidence and
held that the "simulator solution and calibration records [were] testi-
monial for Sixth Amendment purposes and . . . inadmissible absent
live testimony by those who prepared them."6
The prosecution sought to prove Carreira's intoxication by us-
ing the evidence taken from the breathalyzer' administered to Carrei-
893 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Watertown City Ct. 2010).
2 Id. at 844. See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1 192(2)-(2-a) (McKinney 2010).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him ..... Article 1, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in relevant
part: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and de-
fend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."
4 Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
Id.
6 Id. at 846, 851.
See People v. Serrano, 539 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Kings Cnty. Crim. Ct. 1989).
The Smith & Wesson Model 900A breathalyzer uses a photometric sys-
tem which traps a measured sample of deep lung air from the suspect's
breath and runs that sample through a . . . chemical solution . .. [which
causes] a light-sensitive meter to move proportionately, thereby produc-
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ra, which registered a blood alcohol level of .23%.8 In order to subs-
tantiate these results, the prosecution provided a lab analyst's written
certification of the breathalyzer's proper functioning instead of his
live testimony.9 The certification stated that the breathalyzer had
been inspected, maintained, and calibrated properly.'o The People
attempted to submit this evidence under New York's business records
hearsay exception." Under New York's business records exception,
"[a]ny writing or record ... made as a memorandum or record of any
act . . . shall be admissible in evidence in proof of that act, transac-
tion, occurrence, or event, if the judge finds that it was made in the
regular course of any business."l 2
Mrs. Carreira filed a motion to preclude the analyst's affidavit
and the breathalyzer results from evidence.' 3 Carreira asserted, the
evidence was subject to the Confrontation Clause because of its tes-
timonial nature, and the failure to provide the authors of the certifi-
cates for cross-examination violated her right to confront the wit-
nesses against her.14
The majority of New York State courts, post-Crawford, have
held that certificates establishing the reliability of a breathalyzer "are
nontestimonial [and not subject to confrontation] because they are not
prepared specifically for use in court or in gathering incriminating in-
formation against a particular individual." 5  The courts explained
that the records were created to ensure reliability, were neutral be-
cause they were not tested by law enforcement, and the results were
recorded prior to an individual being charged with a crime.16 In addi-
tion, the records are classified as "business records [because they are]
' Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
9 Id.
o Id. at 845.
Id. (noting that the business records exception allows counsel to circumvent hearsay
rules and submit evidence maintained in the regular course of business). See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4518(a) (McKinney 2010).
12 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(a). The regular course of business is defined as "routine reflections
of day-to-day operations [conducted]." People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1028 (N.Y.
2008).
" Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
14 id
" Id. at 846-47.
16 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 928, 931-32 (N.Y. 2009) (explaining that cross-
examination of technicians on how they used typing machines to create reports would not
provide any more "subjective analysis" than already provided).
[Vol. 27828
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created systematically pursuant to state statute . . . [and] are not
aimed at a particular individual or prosecution."17 Finally, the courts
believe that "the records provide only indirect or foundational evi-
dence against defendants; that is, evidence is only testimonial if it
goes directly to establishing a fact used to prove [a] defendant's guilt,
not indirectly to establish the reliability of the [breathalyzer]."18 Af-
ter the Supreme Court's most recent decision in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,'9 New York courts have produced starkly different
results on this question. The courts have failed to reach a consensus
as to whether breathalyzer certification records constitute testimonial
evidence.20
After careful consideration, the court in Carreira granted the
motion to exclude the evidence of the lab analyst's affidavit certify-
ing the breathalyzer's proper functioning, reasoning that the records
violated the Confrontation Clause. 2' The records were testimonial
because the certification was " 'made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use later at trial.' ,22 Also, the records in
question were not atypical business records. 23 Although the certifica-
tion of the breathalyzer was done in the regular course of business,
the purpose of the certificates was "expressly for use in litigation"
and lacked the "neutrality typical business records enjoy because they
are created by law enforcement[,] . . . for law enforcement[,] . . .
[and] not . . . by a third party truly indifferent to the outcomes of
criminal prosecutions."24 Although the court recognized that the cre-
ation of the certificates was mandated by law, the court believed
"[t]hese records [were] not created for their own sake; rather, their
entire purpose [was] to help provide reliable evidence for prosecuting
DWI suspects."25 The records were quintessential to establishing
" Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
18 Id.
'9 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
20 See, e.g., People v. DiBari, 2010 WL 432361 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 8, 2010).
21 Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
22 Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532).
23 Id. at 848-49.
24 Id. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111-13 (1943) (holding an accident report
provided by a railroad company did not qualify for the business exception because the report
was prepared specifically for litigation and not for the efficient and useful operation of the
railroad).
25 Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
2011] 829
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proof of DWI in court, and if they were not, then the records would
not be necessary.26 Lastly, the judge was concerned with fraudulent
and inaccurate analysis and believed his decision would help main-
tain scientific integrity by holding incompetent or fraudulent analysts
accountable to the court. 27 Therefore, the court granted the defen-
dant's motion to preclude, and required the prosecution to produce
the analysts who prepared the "simulator solution and calibration
records." 28
An exploration of the historical roots and underpinnings of
the Confrontation Clause is a vital exercise into understanding how
the Clause has evolved into its current state and how it is applied in
the federal and New York State court systems. The concept of con-
fronting one's accusers pre-dates colonization and stretches "back to
Roman times." 29 "The Roman Governor Festus ... [once] stated: 'It
is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before
the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a
chance to defend himself against the charges.' ,30 Even during the
most historically powerful reign of Churches and the Papacy, the
right to face one's accuser remained intact. More importantly,
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, one court held that
"no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty
to cross[-]examine." 32  Furthermore, courts at times have granted
criminal defendants even greater rights. For example, one such court
went as far as preventing the admission of prior testimony, even after
the party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.33 This
brief anecdotal account of the historical birth and development of the
Confrontation Clause portrays a strong historical foundation, which
26 id
27 Id. at 849-50 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536).
28 Id. at 846, 851.
29 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
30 Francis Hermann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 482 (1994). See Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (2010) (hold-
ing a screen placed in front of child abuse victims violated the confrontation clause because
it prevented a face to face encounter with the accused).
31 Hermann & Speer, supra note 30, at 522-23.
32 State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 104 (1794) (per curiam).
3 State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 440-41 (1858). See Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701,
707-08 (1827) (holding prior testimony was inadmissible in criminal cases even if there was
a previous opportunity to cross-examine).
830 [Vol. 27
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exemplified the significance of the right to confrontation and the dis-
trust for testimonial hearsay.34
Hearsay evidence3 1 is limited by state rules and exceptions,
which can be juxtaposed with the Confrontation Clause.36 There are
numerous types of hearsay evidence and their respective excep-
tions. 37  Generally, the hearsay rule requires that "no assertion of-
fered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open to test
by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination." 38  If
the Confrontation Clause was read literally, every time hearsay evi-
dence was admitted, cross-examination would be required; however,
this is not the case.39 While hearsay rules vary among jurisdictions,40
they provide numerous exceptions, which allow for the admission of
hearsay and enable parties to circumvent confrontation concerns.4'
In an attempt to redefine or restore rights granted to criminal defen-
dants under the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court divided
hearsay evidence into two distinct classifications-testimonial and
non-testimonial. 42  Testimonial hearsay is governed by the Confron-
tation Clause, whereas non-testimonial hearsay evidence circumvents
the clause.43 This decision was cast down in the landmark case
Crawford v. Washington.4 4
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
34 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
3 Hearsay evidence "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R.
EVID. 801(c). See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 327 (3d ed. 2006) (defining hearsay as "testi-
mony that is given by a witness [putting forth] not what [they] know[] personally, but what
others have said, and that is therefore dependent on the credibility of someone other than the
witness").
36 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)).
3 See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES TO THE COURTROOM 699 (2009) (stating the rules of evidence provide for "thirty dif-
ferent hearsay exceptions").
38 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 327 (3d ed. 2006).
3 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. See Green, 399 U.S. at 166-67 (concluding the confrontation
clause is not violated from out of court statements as long as the declarant was cross-
examined); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (recognizing that
competing interests may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial).
0 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62.
41 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (3d ed. 2006).
42 MERurrr & SIMMONS, supra note 37, at 723.
43 id.
4 541 U.S. at 34.
2011] 83 1
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revive the Confrontation Clause's original intent and dispensed with
twenty-five years of precedent by overturning Ohio v. Roberts.45 The
Court attempted to redefine the previous standard by holding that
evidence which was testimonial was subject to the Confrontation
Clause and evidence which was non-testimonial was admissible sub-
ject only to state or federal hearsay exceptions. 4 6 If a court deter-
mines that the evidence was an out of court statement "made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact," then this may consti-
tute testimonial evidence, thereby triggering the Confrontation
Clause.47 After establishing that an out of court statement has been
made, the evidence is inadmissible unless the proponent can show
that the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.48 The courts were no
longer able to consider whether testimonial statements were admissi-
ble absent confrontation. However, the Court failed to provide a
comprehensive definition of testimonial evidence by only listing ex-
amples such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prose-
cutorially."4 9 The facts of this case provide interesting insight into
the importance of the Confrontation Clause to criminal defendants.
In this watershed case, the defendant, Mr. Crawford, was ar-
rested and charged with assault." The police interrogated both him
and his wife, an alleged accomplice to the assault." The police were
trying to determine whether Mr. Crawford's actions were truly moti-
45 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (holding the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of
testimonial statements against a defendant if the statement bore significant "indicia of relia-
bility"). Indicia of reliability is established when the "evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception [in the state]" or the hearsay is deemed to be "trustworthy." Id. at 66.
The Court believed that the Roberts test led to unpredictable results and was too amorphous.
Crawford 541 U.S. at 63. See, e.g., Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va.
Ct. App. 2003) (holding the statement was reliable because it was made in police custody
and against the defendant's interest). But see State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding a statement was reliable because the witness was not in custody and not
a suspect).
4 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 68.
4 Id. at 51.
48 See id. at 68.
49 Id. at 5 1.
'o Id. at 38, 40.
5 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-39.
832 [Vol. 27
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vated by self-defense.52 Mr. and Mrs. Crawford provided differing
stories on that point, raising the question of Mr. Crawford's guilt.53
At trial, the State attempted to enter Mrs. Crawford's testimony de-
scribing the events which transpired during the assault.5 4  Subse-
quently, Mr. Crawford objected, claiming Mrs. Crawford's testimony
was forbidden without her husband's permission under Washington
State Law; therefore, her testimony violated his Sixth Amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him. 5 However, the court
admitted the testimony, resulting in Mr. Crawford's conviction. 56
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the state court, and
held that testimonial evidence may only be admitted in accord with
the Confrontation Clause, which requires that the witness appear at
trial, or "the declarant [must be] unavailable [to testify], and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." 57
The Court felt the two opposing statements made by the Crawfords
made it even more important that statements be tested because the
"Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, [not dis-
cretionally or substantively] but . . . procedural[1y]" through cross-
58examination.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, con-
52 See id. at 39.
5 Id. at 40.
5 Id. at 39-40. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (stating a
spouse or domestic partner cannot testify or be examined without the consent of the other).
16 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
" Id. at 59.
58 Id. at 61. The Court explained that when statements are "interlocking" or ambiguous
from a party or parties it is the process of cross-examination through which the truth can be
pulled out. Id at 65-67. The Framers of the Constitution would not have left cases up to
open-ended balancing tests which can be subject to a lack of impartiality. Id. at 53-54, 67.
Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the belief that the Confrontation Clause barred testi-
monial statements, arguing that fluctuation in case law makes it hard to determine the fra-
mers original intent. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Compare State
v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (1807) (per curiam) (holding testimony was prohibited even after the
witness was subjected to cross-examination), with King v. Eriswell, (1790) 100 Eng. Rep.
815, 819 (K.B.) (allowing the admission of ex parte testimony when the declarant was not
available). Rehnquist also believed the Framers never intended for a hard and fast rule, ex-
plaining there were always exceptions to exclusion of hearsay and "[iut is an odd conclusion
indeed to think that the Framers created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the admissibility
of testimonial statements when the law during their own time was not fully settled." Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 73.
2011] 833
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curred with the judgment.5 9 Rehnquist's main concerns were that the
new test would provide unnecessary benefits to the accused, prolong
litigation, and fail to provide a specific definition of testimonial evi-
dence which would cause problems with interpretation.60
To further illustrate Justice Rehnquist's concerns with Craw-
ford's failure to provide a specific definition for testimonial evidence,
just two years later, in Davis v. Washington,61 the Court addressed
whether statements made to a police officer were testimonial. 62  Al-
though the Court in Crawford already established that the Confronta-
tion Clause only applied to testimonial statements, Davis set the
boundaries of statements made in emergency situations.
During an assault, the victim contacted a 911 operator seeking
emergency assistance.64 Shortly thereafter, the assailant fled the
home in anticipation of police support. 65 After the assailant fled, the
victim provided additional information to the operator about the as-
sailant and the events that transpired. 66 Before long, the police ar-
rived at the victim's home and documented the events that oc-
curred. At trial, the officers took the stand and recounted the events
which they witnessed at the scene of the alleged crime. 68 The victim
failed to appear at trial and prevented the defendant from having an
opportunity for cross-examination. 69  The Court held that "[state-
ments made to police] are testimonial when the circumstances objec-
tively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to [a] later criminal prosecution."70
' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
60 Id. at 75. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("[T]he rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to
the accused."). The Majority acknowledged its failure to provide a specific definition of tes-
timonial, but argued that it was only a temporary problem, whereas the Roberts test caused
permanent uncertainty. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (majority opinion).
6' 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
62 Id. at 817.
63 Id. See also Crawford, 158 U.S. at 68 (citing police interrogations as testimonial).
6 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
65 Id. at 818.
SId at 818.
67 id
68 See id. at 818-19.
69 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
70 Id. at 822.
834 [Vol. 27
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Therefore, after the assailant left the home and the assault ceased, any
questions asserted by the 911 operator and answered by the victim
were testimonial and inadmissible without an opportunity to cross-
examine the victim/declarant." Furthermore, the Court held that
statements "are non[-]testimonial when made in the course of [a] po-
lice interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency." 72
Although the Court answered questions resolving problems
associated with emergency situations, it failed to address statements
made by laboratory personnel regarding evidentiary testing. In Me-
lendez-Diaz, police officers, operating on a tip, detained and searched
the defendant in a Kmart parking lot.73 Their search revealed twenty-
three bags of a substance resembling cocaine.74 In order to identify
the substance, the police department sent it to a lab for chemical
analysis.75 After chemical analysis, the lab confirmed the substance
as cocaine.76 At trial, the court allowed into evidence the forensic re-
ports connecting the defendant to the cocaine seized by police offic-
ers.77 The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence at tri-
al, arguing that the Confrontation Clause "required the analysts [of
the substance] to testify in person."7 8 The Massachusetts court over-
ruled the objection and admitted the evidence. Subsequently, the
defendant was convicted of distributing and trafficking cocaine.o
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The majority of the Court believed that the documents in
question "fe]ll within the 'core class of testimonial statements' [de-
scribed in Crawford]."82 The Court provided two main arguments
71 Id. at 828-29.
72 Id. at 822.




n See id. at 2531.
78 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
79 See id.
80 Id at 2530.
81 Id. at 2531.
82 Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
2011] 835
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for its conclusion. First, the documents were clearly affidavits used
for "establishing or proving some fact."8 3 The evidence from the la-
boratory identifying the substance and the weight of the cocaine were
necessary for establishing a prima facie case against the defendant.84
Second, it was reasonable to assume the analysts knew the production
of the laboratory results were for prosecution "at a later trial," and
therefore were testimonial.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, furthered this analysis
and retorted the dissent's main concerns. First, he explained that
confrontation was necessary to weed out incompetent and fraudulent
analysts because scientific testing was not always neutral or relia-
ble.86 In addition, the majority disagreed that these results could be
admitted under the business records exception, arguing that the ex-
ception was inapplicable because the business activity performed was
producing evidence for use at trial.
Although the majority addressed some concerns, it once again
would leave courts wrestling with interpretation. The Court refused
to provide a bright line rule in determining who during the analytical
process may be subject to cross-examination." The implications of
[These statements include] material such as affidavits, custodial exami-
nations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine,
or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially . . . [and] statements that were made under cir-
cumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
8 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
' Id. at 2531.
8 Id. at 2532.
86 Id. at 2536. The dissent argued that the cross-examination of analysts retains little val-
ue, explaining that " 'one would not reasonably expect a laboratory professional . . . to feel
quite differently about the results of his scientific test by having to look at the defendant.' "
Id. at 2536. The Majority stated that " '[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty.' " Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
7 Id. at 2538.
88 Id. at 2532. This has created confusion amongst the courts, including those in New
York. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ex-
plaining "[t]he limits of Melendez-Diaz are still being developed[,]" and holding "[o]nly the
final [critical] stage of the DNA testing involved the type of analytical judgment for which a
certificate would be an inadequate substitute for in-court testimony"); see also United States
v. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 2009) (upholding admission of toxicology report
where supervising toxicologist who reviewed data and reported conclusion testified at trial).
10
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this particular failure are relatively unknown, as they have gone fairly
unaddressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals; however, they
may provide an interesting opening for debate amongst prosecutors
and defense attorneys.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
failed to address the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Melendez-Diaz. In United States v. Feliz,89 decided prior to Melen-
dez-Diaz, the court decided that autopsy reports were not testimoni-
al. 90 Similar to certification of breathalyzers, the government entered
nine autopsy reports performed by medical professionals into evi-
dence as business records.9 ' The defendant argued that the admission
of those documents violated the Confrontation Clause because he was
unable to cross-examine the medical examiners who prepared those
documents. 92 The district court rejected that argument and the court
of appeals affirmed. 93 The court explained that a more limited defini-
tion of testimonial is appropriate and the fact that a "medical examin-
er [would] reasonably ... expect [that] autopsy reports may be avail-
able for use at trial . . . cannot be dispositive on the issue of whether
those reports are testimonial." 94 Interestingly, Feliz still holds prece-
dential value in the Second Circuit; however, district courts have ex-
pressed reservations about how Melendez-Diaz impacts this deci-
sion.95
The Supreme Court has caused some discontent and confu-
sion after ushering in a new standard; a standard which failed to pro-
vide a bright line rule for the justiciability of Confrontation Clause
' 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Erbo v. United States, 549 U.S.
1238 (2007).
90 Id. at 238.
9' Id. at 229.
92 id
9 Id. at 229, 238.
94 Feliz, at 235.
9 See Vega v. Walsh, No. 06-CV-6492 (ARR) (JO), 2010 WL 1685819, at *29 n.8
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010).
Although Melendez-Diaz is unquestionably in tension-and probably ir-
reconcilable-with Feliz, it neither explicitly overruled the latter case nor
made its holding untenable. As a result, even if the court concludes (as I
do) that applying the rule of Melendez-Diaz would forbid the admission
of (this] testimony, it must nevertheless apply Feliz unless and until a
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issues. Although the Supreme Court has remedied some areas of ma-
jor concern, it seems content dealing with issues as they arise. Os-
tensibly, federal courts will have to adjudicate grey areas within their
best interpretation of the spirit of Crawford until the Supreme Court
decides to take further action. Despite the confusion and frustration,
this standard does not stop at federal courthouse doors. State courts,
particularly in New York, fair no better and continue to find them-
selves confronted with the same enigma.
In Pointer v. Texas,96 the United States Supreme Court made
the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states in criminal prosecu-
tions.97 Consequently, after Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, New
York courts have applied the new rules with conflicting results. The
new standard created confusion in the courts because New York's
business record hearsay exception conflicted with the Court's state-
ment that " 'pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably ex-
pect to be used prosecutorially' " constituted testimonial evidence
subject to confrontation. 98 This confusion has caused disagreement
amongst New York courts as to whether the records are indeed busi-
ness records, and if so, whether they still may be subject to confronta-
tion demands.
In People v. Orpin,99 the court addressed a defendant charged
with driving while intoxicated.'00 "[T]he prosecution [entered] into
evidence [] the record of inspection, maintenance, and calibration
prepared by the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services for
the [breathalyzer] . . . and [] a certification of analysis" of the solution
used in the breathalyzer.'0 ' The prosecution argued that the evidence
96 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
9 Id. at 407.
9 See People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515-16 (Irondequoit J. Ct. 2005) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (expressing a difficulty in making a decision because the question
presented satisfied both opposing tests in Crawford); see also People v. Heyanka, 886
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2009) (holding the breathalyzer reports were in-
admissible until the People produced the technician for cross-examination and that holding
certificates "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial[]' are testimonial in na-
ture") (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532). The court reasoned, because the reports
were prepared with a "reasonable expectation that they would be used in [a] criminal prose-
cution[]" they were testimonial in nature and subject to the confrontation clause. Id.
796 N.Y.S.2d 512.
'"Id at 513.
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was non-testimonial and admissible via the business record rule ex-
ception.102 The defense countered, arguing the evidence was testi-
monial and a violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause.103  The court struggled to rectify New York's business
records exception and the new standard promulgated in Crawford.'04
The records satisfy the business records exception; however, the
court interpreted the Supreme Court's concern for government in-
volvement "in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial"
as indicating "that business records are subject to the same confronta-
tion demands as other out-of-court statements."' 05  Based on this
premise and an objective analysis, the court believed that the decla-
rants knew these certificates would be used in criminal prosecutions;
hence, the statements are testimonial and implicate the Confrontation
Clause.106 Furthermore, the court believed "[s]ubjecting the persons
who conduct these calibration tests to the 'crucible of cross-
examination' will help ensure the reliability of their work."' 07
In a direct rebuke of the Orpin decision, the District Attorney
in Green v. DeMarco0 8 asked the court to declare that "the use of
government-generated business records to establish the foundation
requirements for the admission of breathalyzer test results d[id] not
violate the Confrontation Clause."' 09 The District Attorney argued
that future DWI cases would be dismissed because it was nearly im-
possible to furnish the witnesses who certified the breathalyzer's
proper functioning." 0 Upon making its determination, the court fo-
cused on Orpin 's reasoning that the evidence was testimonial because
the certification was done primarily for purposes of litigation."' The
102 Id. at 514.
103 Id.
'" See Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
'os Id. at 516.
106 Id. See also Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
the admission of an affidavit proving the breathalyzer's proper functionality violated Craw-
ford because the affidavit contained statements that would reasonably be expected to be used
prosecutorially).
107 Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 517 (noting there had been "recent problems even with relia-
bility of the FBI laboratory's analyses").
108 812 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
'" Id. at 774.
"0 Id. at 773-74.
1' Id. at 781. See also People v. Foster, 261 N.E.2d 389, 391-92 (N.Y. 1970) (holding
that if records are required by the business and made for reasons other than litigation, the
business exception still applied).
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court disagreed, finding the records were clearly business records be-
cause their sole purpose was not for litigation; the records were pri-
marily produced for "quality assurance."" 2 Furthermore, the brea-
thalyzer certificates were neutral because they only related "to the
operation of the breath test instrument and the reference solution used
to calibrate it," and were not created for any prosecution of a particu-
lar defendant." 3  Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, the court
held that the certification of the breathalyzer's functionality did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause.114  The majority of New York
courts are in accord with DeMarco."'
Although the previous cases discussed have involved criminal
defendants charged with driving while intoxicated, the New York
Court of Appeals decided a case with strikingly similar facts to those
of Melendez-Diaz. In People v. Brown,"l6 the court held that neutral
scientific reports that did not accuse the defendant or establish a fact
necessary to prove the defendant's guilt were non-testimonial."' The
victim of a rape entered the hospital for medical treatment."' After
an examination, the staff prepared a rape kit which was sent for test-
ing to the Medical Examiner's office." 9 After the rape kit was
processed and recorded, it registered a cold hit an astounding "nine
years after the crime." 20 Subsequently, the police located the defen-
dant and charged him with "two counts of sodomy in the first degree,
112 DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (holding the state mandated certification of materials is
a legitimate business practice even in the absence of litigation).
113 Id. at 783. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2004).
114 DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 782-83.
11s See People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008); People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d
1162 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824 (App. Term 2d Dep't 2006);
People v. Harvey, No. 09100144, 2010 WL 376935 (Niagara Cnty. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010);
People v. Brooks, No. 23961 C/07, 2008 WL 4934628 (Bronx Cnty. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2008);
People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Queens Cnty. Crim. Ct. 2005); People v. Krueger, 804
N.Y.S.2d 908 (Niagra Cnty. Just. Ct. 2005); People v. Mellott, 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Monroe
Cnt . Just. Ct. 2005).
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928.
117 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931 ("The [r]eport ... was not 'testimonial' under such circums-
tances because it consisted of merely machine-generated graphs, charts and numerical data.
There were no conclusions, interpretations or comparisons apparent in the report since the
technicians' use of the typing machine would not have entailed any such subjective analy-
sis.").
I.s Id. at 928.
" Id.
120 Id. at 928-29.
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kidnapping in the second degree, three counts of assault in the second
degree and endangering the welfare of a child."' 2' At trial, the
People called a forensic biologist who examined the defendant's file
and used that data to link the defendant to the crime.122 Then, the
People moved to enter the reports into evidence under the business
records exception.123 However, the defendant objected and argued
that his inability to cross-examine the analyst who had performed the
test constituted a violation of his right to confrontation.124 The court
affirmed the lower court's decision to allow the admission of the
records under the business records exception. 125 The court reasoned
that the analysis performed by the technicians was neutral because it
did not require any discretion and a suspect was not yet named during
its undertaking.126 Furthermore, the technicians would not have been
able to offer anything additional to the case, and the proper person
with discretion over the data was available for cross-examination.127
Brown was an acknowledgement that Melendez-Diaz broa-
dened the breadth and scope of testimonial hearsay evidence. Al-
though the defendant in Brown was unable to cross-examine the orig-
inal analyst who performed the work, he was able to cross-examine
the medical examiner who interpreted the results.128 This might lead
to the conclusion that Brown was less about the debate of evidence
with an eye toward prosecution being testimonial and more of a de-
bate about whom down the chain of analysts may be subject to cross-
examination.129
Additionally, Brown relied upon the rationale that instrument
121 Id. at 929.
122 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.
123 Id. at 930.
124 Id. at 929.
125 Id. at 933.
126 Id. at 931-32.
127 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931-32. See also People v. Kelly, No. 2007NY078228, 2009
WL 5183779, at *34 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Dec. 22, 2009) (holding that breathalyzer calibra-
tion tests were non-testimonial because they were performed prior to the defendant's arrest,
were not prepared for a specific defendant, and were scientifically neutral because the certi-
fications were "devoid of any opinions or subjective conclusions"); People v. Lent, 908
N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Term 9th and 10th Jud. Dists. 2010).
128 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931-32.
129 Id. at 932 (stating "not everyone 'whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the
chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in
person as part of the prosecution's case' " (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532)).
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testing is scientifically neutral.130 This reliability argument has been
disposed of by the Supreme Court, stating, "[d]ispensing with con-
frontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispens-
ing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty."' 3' The
neutrality argument contains further flaws. Under this argument, a
police officer should not be subject to cross-examination. The offic-
er's administration and recordation of the breathalyzer is a neutral
non-discretionary procedure. The officer's job is to administer a test
and record a numerical signal, by which a determination is made
based upon the law-whether the number registers above or below
legal limits. The officer does not have the ability to determine
whether the breathalyzer is in working order, because that has been
certified for the officer by scientific professionals. Therefore, argua-
bly this procedure is more neutral and/or reliable than the scientific
procedure used to analyze a breathalyzer. Furthermore, the test to as-
sure proper performance of the device is essential to "establishing or
proving [the] fact" that the device registered the correct reading and
therefore, based upon that reading, the defendant is guilty.132 The
certification records are a clear link necessary to proving the defen-
dant's offense, without it the results would lack necessary credibility.
After a thorough analysis of Melendez-Diaz, it becomes evi-
dent that Carreira much more closely interprets the true intent of the
Supreme Court. First, both the records certifying the breathalyzer
and the certificates of forensic analysis in Melendez-Diaz are affida-
vits and clearly within one of the definable classes of testimonial
statements set forth by Crawford. 1 In addition, the majority stated
that the affidavits were " 'made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.' "134 The Court described
this application as "straightforward." 3 5 If the same straightforward
analysis was applied to the certification of breathalyzer functionality,
it is evident that analysts would believe their statements would be
used at trial sometime in the future, because the instruments they are
130 Id. at 931-32.
' ' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
132 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
113 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
134 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
131 Id. at 2533.
[Vol. 27842
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/18
CONFRONTATION CLA USE
testing are used to determine whether a defendant does or does not
have the legal limit of alcohol in his or her system. If the defendant
has been charged, the affidavit certifying the breathalyzer's suitabili-
ty for police use will be used at trial. Otherwise, these documents are
unnecessary; if the breathalyzer was not certified for proper use, it
would never end up in the hands of police officers. However, even if
testimonial, it is argued that the document is admissible under the
hearsay exception for business records.
This is one of the main arguments for the document's admis-
sibility. Proponents argue that the records certifying breathalyzers
are admissible under the business records exception because the
records are produced through a mandate by the state to obtain quality
assurance of their utility. Although these records are made in the
regular course of business, the majority in Melendez-Diaz stated the
records were not admissible if the "regularly conducted business ac-
tivity is the production of evidence for use at trial."13 6 While there
may be quality assurance purposes, the main function of the record
keeping is to provide documentation for the court as a certification of
the criminal result. The State has an interest in obtaining successful
prosecution of drunk drivers. Therefore, the creation of a statute does
not entitle an immediate presumption of business function, and the
People cannot hide behind quality assurance to circumvent their true
intention of producing evidence for the successful conviction of DWI
charges at trial. If the instrument had not been certified, the evidence
would hold no weight and there would most likely be no conviction.
Also, it is important to recognize that Justice Scalia never pro-
nounced that all business records were non-testimonial.13 7
Justice Scalia did acknowledge that "[b]usiness and public
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because
they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because ...
[they are] not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at
trial."' 3 8 The question that New York courts struggle with is whether
the sole purpose of the records must be to prove some fact at trial, or
whether another legitimate purpose trumps the record's testimonial
status. In analyzing the breathalyzer records, it is clear that two pur-
poses may exist. However, it is also abundantly clear how much
136 Id. at 2538.
' See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
13 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
2011] 843
17
Puma: City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Carreira
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOUROLAWREVIEW
weight and power these certificates provide to prosecutors at trial.
Acknowledging this factor should push the dial towards rendering
these records as testimonial evidence.
Once the records have been classified as testimonial, the pro-
ponent of the evidence must produce a witness, however, a large
question still remains. Even if New York courts were to determine
that breathalyzer certification records were testimonial, Melendez-
Diaz still fails to answer just who during the analytical process is sub-
ject to cross-examination. This is a critical question that deserves se-
rious consideration. Some courts may only allow a supervisor to tes-
tify; yet that practice may fail to catch integral mistakes unnoticed
beneath his or her control. However, as the Court stated, not every-
one involved in the process must be produced for cross-examination.
This is a reasonable determination, but one which still leaves several
questions to be answered.
Any rigid standard is likely to be ineffective. The best ap-
proach may be a case by case analysis. Some cases may only require
a supervisor or even a single technician, where others may have in-
volved multiple parties in which each party's role should be carefully
scrutinized. The judge should examine the process by which the sub-
stance or procedure in question was performed. Then, there should
be a determination made about which technicians were involved in
the most intricate steps of the analysis or the steps most prone to er-
ror. The technician or technicians involved in these steps should ap-
pear for testimony. At the very least, the prosecution should be re-
quired to produce one supervisor who has approved the handling of
the process, and a technician who was most heavily involved in that
process. This will ensure more accurate results and convictions.
Critics may argue that the cross-examination of officers from
Albany who had tested the solution and calibrated the breathalyzer is
impossible.139 This can easily be remedied through legislation which
creates an organized process of connecting each analyst and/or tech-
nician to each breathalyzer tested. Elected officials and bureaucratic
agencies are highly equipped and certainly experienced at carrying
out such a task.
Beyond legal arguments, allowing criminal defendants to con-
front certified records prepared through laboratory analysis consti-
1' See, e.g., DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (noting that the District Attorney contended it
was nearly "impossible for him to produce . .. the required witnesses from Albany").
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tutes sound public policy. Many courts have enumerated this policy
in their decisions.140 Although it is true that the certification of brea-
thalyzers does not involve forensic science, the procedures used to
determine the proper chemical levels in the instrument do require
some degree of scientific discretion and expertise. Akin to any scien-
tific testing regardless of field, the sciences being performed will al-
ways be subject to human error. The level of difficulty in attaining
legal checks on scientific testing is a small consideration when the
calculations subject to error are determining the preservation or de-
privation of liberty. Without confrontation, there exists no check on
shoddy work or human error and may foster an environment more
susceptible to mistakes. These mistakes are certainly possible and
will lead to false convictions. The introduction of the availability of
cross-examination of officers who perform this work for New York
State will provide a level of accountability and a higher level of care
into the certification. "[T]he Confrontation "Clause is [a] deterrent
... upon falsification of records and reports, and [it provides] corres-
ponding encouragement of careful recordkeeping and documentation
of evidence."l 4' This is an enormously large and sound public policy
concern providing substantial weight against saving these analysts
from the crucible of cross-examination.
Although Carreira has provided a significant amount of con-
troversy, the likelihood of it influencing other cases within New York
State is still relatively unknown. The case takes clear positions with
sound parallelism to Melendez-Diaz which hopefully can guide future
cases to similar results. Unfortunately, the decision is in a growing
minority. Post Melendez-Diaz, the majority of New York courts con-
tinue to hold that the business records exception is applicable, ar-
guing that the records sole purpose is to ensure quality performance
of the device and not to be used in criminal prosecutions.142 The
court in Carreira should be commended for its eloquent criticism on
this issue. Many constitutional triumphs have started with a bold
stance challenging customary attitudes, interpretations, and opinions.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause remains an
integral part of the truth seeking process in our court system. A fun-
140 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
141 Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REv. 475, 501 (2006).
142 See Kelly, 2009 WL 5183779 at *3; Harvey, 2010 WL 376935 at *3; DiBari, 2010 WL
432361 at *3; Lent, 908 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
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damental question asks whether the decision in Crawford has main-
tained, improved, or hampered its purpose. Interestingly enough, the
Court attempted to provide a more consistent standard which embo-
died the framers' original intent. Although the Supreme Court at-
tempted to provide a clearer standard with more consistent results, it
has failed to answer the question of what is testimonial evidence.143
The Court did list some examples, such as "affidavits, custodial ex-
aminations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasona-
bly expect to be used prosecutorially."'" However, by leaving the
question open ended, the Court contradicted its own criticism of the
Roberts test, which it believed was too discretionary, subjective, and
ultimately left too much in the hands of the justices. The failure to
provide a strict definition of testimonial hearsay has once again put
discretion and subjectivity in the hands of those whom the test was
deemed to take it out of.
Even with the decision's shortcomings, it is still a profoundly
better standard than the Roberts test. This new test provides a reinvi-
gorated life into our judicial system through a renewed trust in the
process-a process that was designed to get to the truth. The critics
will argue that by taking more discretion out of the hands of the jus-
tices, the Crawford standard will not allow as much evidence to be
admitted without cross-examination and therefore prolong an already
long and arduous process. This criticism may be correct, but it is
misguided. The judicial system offers much frustration, not unlike
our political institutions, because of its slow reach to results. How-
ever, when someone's liberty is at stake, time is hardly something to
be regarded higher than a judicious result.
Michael J. Puma*
143 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a compre-
hensive definition of 'testimonial.' ").
'" Id. at 51.
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